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NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves construction of a lease and whether or
not it grants to the Appellant, Bowen's, Inc., the right to a new
ten-year term after the expiration of the original lease.

The case

also involves the question of whether or not Charles and Shirley
Bowen are to be held individually liable for the obligation of
Bowen's, Inc.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court awarded judgment in favor of the Respondents
and against Bowen's, Inc. and Charles and Shirley Bowen, as individuals, in the amount of $35,000.00, which amount was based upon
the rental value of the subject premises at the rate of $3,500.00
per month, during the pendency of this action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
That the Order awarding judgment against Charles and Shirley
Bowen, as individuals, be reversed; and further, that the lease in
this matter be construed as granting to Bowen's, Inc. the right to
a new ten-year term at the expiration of that original lease.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about August 31, 1966, Diamonds Development, Inc.
leased a facility comprised of a bowling alley, lounge and cafe
known as the Kearns Bowling Lanes, and located at 3951 West 5400
South, Kearns, Utah, to Howard C.

Ne!son~n~~-·

_Roy Brown.
I

Subsequently, Diamon~~~e-~opment~ __Inc. sol_9~£erred\ the
subject property to Manivest Corporation.

On August 20, 1973,
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Howard C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown sold and transferred their intere;:
in the bowling business to Bowen's, I_n_c. ,, Appellant herein.

The

interest of Howard C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown in the subject lease
was transferred to Bowen's, Inc. on August 28, 1975.

(Ex. 2-P)

Subsequently, Manivest's interest was acquired by the Respondents.'
The following depicts the chain of the various interests
set forth above:
Lessor

Lessee

Diamonds Development, Inc.

Howard C. Nelson and
Roy Brown

w.

Manivest Corporation

t

Bowen's, Inc.

Respondents
The original lease agreement (Ex. 32-D) provided for a
term of ten years with rent payable at the rate of $1,700.00 per ci
during the heavy bowling season, from September through April; anc
$725.00 per month during each of the other months of the year.

At

the end of the ten-year term, the lease provided an
,- -----option/first
r~ght
-,

of refusal to the Lessee which provided for an

ten-year term.
--~

~

---------

addi~onal

---Pursuant to the provisions of the lease, Bowen's,

--~-~---~~

-~-----~

---

--~--

-

-

----------

Inc. gave notice of their intent to renew more than ninety days
prior to the expiration of said lease.

(Ex. 3-P)

Respondents gave notice to Appellants of the terms unde
which the premises would be re-leased, stating that the terms wers
non-negotiable.

(Ex. 4-P)

Shortly thereafter the Respondents
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tendered an unexecuted lease to Appellants which purported to be a
lease which was to be entered into between Respondents and a third
party.

(Ex. 7-P)

The rental factor provided for in said lease was

$780,000.00 as compared to $165,000.00 for the previous ten-year
period.
In response, Bowen's, Inc. sent a letter to the Respondents
stating that the terms were unreasonable and invoked the provisions
of the original lease relative to the appointment of appraisers for
the purposes of determining a fair rental factor.

Subsequently,

Appellants communicated an offer to pay $2,500.00 as a monthly rental
or in the alternative to once again invoke the terms of the original
lease with reference to the appointment of appraisers.

(Ex. 5-P

and Ex. 6-P)
On July 1, 1976, the Respondents withdrew the premises from
consideration of a new lease (Ex. 8-P and Ex. 9-P), and upon the
expiration of the original lease on August 31, 1976, Bowen's , Inc.,
pursuant to court order, held over and remained in possession of the
premises during the pendency of this action.
During the hold-over period, Bowen's, Inc. continued to
attempt to tender to Respondents rental payments, which said payments
were continually refused by Respondents.

(Ex. 10-P and Ex. 11-P)

The foregoing events were as a result of discussions held

in 1975 between Appellant Bowen's, Inc. and Manivest Corporation, the
predecessor of Respondent, relative to the re-lease or purchase of
Manivest's interest in the subject property.

Contemporaneously
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thereto, Manivest Corporation and Bowen's, Inc. entered into an
agreement to purchase new pin-setters, and jointly made a down
payment to Brunswick.

Subsequently, because of the ill health of

one of the principals of Bowen's, Inc., and with the approval of
Manivest Corporation, Bowen's, Inc. placed the bowling business,
the cafe and lounge, for sale.

Respondents Gallegos and Catten

indicated interest in the lounge; and Respondents Symes were
desirous of the bowling business, and pursuant to a verbal agreemen:
with Bowen's, Inc., took over the bowling business in March, 1976,
and stayed in possession of said premises for approximately six wed
During this six week period, the Symes together with Mr.

Gallegos~(

Mr. Catten, purchased the building from Manivest Corporation, thus
becoming Bowen's, Inc.'s landlord.

Immediately after becoming

Bowen's landlords, Respondents offered to purchase the businesses
of Bowen's for $35,000.00, stating that that was all the

business~

were worth since Bowen's had no option to release the premises and
of course Bowen's, Inc. then gave notice of intent to release.
Symes, Gallegos and Catten thereafter transferred their interest~'
the subject property to Valley Lanes, a corporation formed by them,
and which is a Respondent herein.
The Court, after trial in this matter, found that the
reasonable rental value of the premises for the hold-over period,

·,ij

$3,500.00 per month, and judgment was awarded for the Respondents
and against Bowen's, Inc. and Charles and Shirley Bowen, as indivi::I
in the sum of $35,000.00.
-4-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR AWARDING A JUDGMENT AGAINST CHARLES
AND SHIRLEY BOWEN AS INDIVIDUALS.
The Trial Court awarded judgment for the Respondents and
against Charles and Shirley Bowen, as individuals, without any grounds,
basis,

docu.~ents

or evidence of any nature presented by Respondents

that the Bowens were or should be held accountable as individuals.
The only possible basis for which the Tria.l Court's determination
for the individual liability of the Bowens might in any way be
inferred is through Exhibit 1-P.

Exhibit 1-P is a purchase agreement

between Howard C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown as sellers of the Kearns
Bowling Lanes business and Bowen's, Inc., a Utah corporation, as the
buyer of Kearns Bowling Lanes business.
Paragraph 9 of Exhibit 1-P denotes that there is an existing
lease entered into by and between Diamonds Development, Inc., a Utah
corporation, as lessor (which lessor's interest was later transferred
and assigned to Manivest Corporation), and Howard C. Nelson and W.
Roy Brown, as lessees; which paragraph states:
"Buyer agrees to faithfully perform all terms,
covenan·cs and conditions cf tb.e said lease
[referring to the lease entered into between
DiarnonJ.s Development, Inc. and Howard C. Nelsen
and w. Roy Brown] and any amendments, modifica·cions an.i addendw11s co said Lease ..,
The lease that was entered into hetween Liamo11ds Development,
Inc. an.i l:iowa:cd

c.

Nelso11 and W. Roy Brown was not, however, assigned

to Bowen's, Inc. until August 28, 1375.
-5-

(Ex.

2-P)
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Thereafter, at the end of the entire purchase agreement
between Howard C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown as sellers of the Kearns
Bowling Lanes business, and Bowen's, Inc., as buyer, Charles Bowen
and Shirley Bowen guaranteed the performance of the terms and
conditions of the purchase agreement.

Charles and Shirley Bowen werl

guaranteeing the performance of Bowen's, Inc. to Howard D. Nelson
and W. Roy Brown on a purchase agreement, but not guaranteeing the
performance of Bowen's, Inc. to Diamonds Development, Inc. or
Manivest Corporation or the Respondents herein on a lease which had
not even been assigned to Bowen's, Inc. at the time that Exhibit l-l
was entered into.
At no time during the proceedings of the trial herein wer:
any documents ever shown or known to be exhibited by Respondents
that Charles and Shirley Bowen ever agreed to be held personally
liable for the obligations of Bowens', Inc. to the lessors.

The

guarantee in the purchase agreement did not in any way run to the
lessors or their assigns.
contract between Howard

c.

The lessors were not a party to the
Nelson and W. Roy Brown and Bowen's, Inc.1

and there was no intention shown or exhibited

by any of the

provisions of Exhibit 1-P that it was the intent of the parties to
have Charles and Shirley Bowen guarantee the performance of Bowen':,
Inc. to the lessors.
"Where the contract is primarily for the benefit of
the parties thereto, the mere fact that a third
party would be incidentally benefited does not give
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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him a right to sue for its breach. An incidental
beneficiary has no enforceable rights or interest
under, and hence he cannot recover on, the contract."
17 Am Jur 2nd, §307.
In Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21

u.

2d 418, 446 P.2d 414,

(196&) this Court defined what an incidental beneficiary is, which
is what the Respondents are in this matter.
The Court used an illustration from Corbin to define an
incidental beneficiary and stated at P.2d 416:
"Where A owes money to a creditor C, or to several
creditors, and B promises A to supply him with money
necessary to pay such deots, no creditor can maintain
suit against B on this promise. . .
In such cases
the performance promised oy B does not itself discharge
A's duty to C or in any other way affect the legal
relations of C.
It may, indeed, tend towards C's getting
what A owes him, since it supplies A with the money or
material that will enable A to perform, hut such a result requires the intervening voluntary action of A.
B's performance may take place in full without C's ever
getting any performance by A or receiving any benefit
whatever.
In such cases, therefore, C is called an
'incidental' beneficiary and is held to have no right."
Respondents herein are merely an incidental beneficiary to
the contract between Nelson and Brown as sellers and Bowen's, Inc.
as buyer of the Kearns Bowling Lanes business.

Charles and Shirley

Bowen were merely guaranteeing the performance of Bowen's, Inc. in
its agreement with Howard C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown.

They were not

guaranteeing the performance of Bowen's, Inc. with the lessors.
To be a third-party beneficiary, as the Respondents would
have this Court believe that it is, the obligation incurred by the
contracting party must run for and be intended for the benefit of a
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party who is not a party to the contract; and further, that it
must be shown by the intent of the parties, as manifested in the
contract itself, that it was the specific intention of the

contr~~

ing party that the benefit is to run to a third party.
See Chatlik v. Allstate Insurance Company, 34 Ohio App.
193, 299 N.E. 2nd 295 (1973).

~

A third party may benefit from a

contract even if he is not named in the contract, as long as he is
contemplated by the parties to the contract and sufficiently
identified thereto, but it must be shown that the contract was made
and entered into with the intent of benefitting that third party;
and a mere incidental or indirect benefit is not sufficient to give
him a right of action.
Also, Snyder v. Townhill Motors, Inc., 193 Pa. Super. 571,
165 At. 2nd 293 (1960).

A third-party beneficiary to a contract

comes into existence when it appears in the contract itself that
both parties to the contract intend that a third party benefit
thereby.
Also see Spires v. Hanover Fire Insurance Company, 364 Pa.
52, 70 At. 2nd 828 (1950).

To be a third-party beneficiary entitled

to recover on a contract both parties to a contract must intend anc
must indicate that intention in the contract; and further, that a
primisor cannot be held liable to an alleged beneficiary of the
contract unless the alleged beneficiary was within the promiser's
contemplation at the time the contract was entered into and such
liability was intentionally assumed by him in his undertaking anc
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the obligation of the third party must be created and must affirmatively appear in the contract itself.
In this particul.3.r matter, the guarantee •1:as made with the
intent of benefitting Howard C. Nelson and

w.

Roy Brown in the

event that Bowen's, Inc. ever failed in its obligations in performing
under the purchase agreement entered into by and between Howard
Nelson and W. Roy Brown and Bowen's, Inc.

c.

There was no intent shown

in that ?Urchase agreement of any nature or any type that Charles
and Shirley Bowen were to guarantee the performance of Bowen's, Inc.
to the lessors of the premises, especially when the
lease agreement was not even assigned to Bowen's, Inc. until
August of 1975.
Bowen's, Inc. wa.s the obligatory party and as such should be
the only party accountable herein.

Charles and Shirley Bowen have

no duty owing to the Respondents and no duty was shown owing by them
to the Respondents in any evidence or documents presented at trial.
The Respondents in this matter are at best incidental beneficiaries
to the contract between Heward C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown and Bowen's
Inc., when Charles and Shirley Bowen agreed to guarantee the
performance of Bowen's, Inc. in that purchase agreement.

As such

incidental beneficiaries, Respondents have no right of action or
cause of action against Charles and Shirley Bowen as individuals.
The judgment awarded to the Respondents against the Bowens as
individuals should be reversed.
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
THE LEASE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN DIAMONDS
DEVELOPMENT, INC. AND HOWARD C. NELSON AND W. ROY BROWN SHOULD BE
CONSTRUED AS GRANTING TO THE LESSEE THE OPTION TO RENEW THE LEASE
FOR A TEN-YEAR PERIOD.
Paragraph 7 of the lease (Ex. 32-D) states as follows:
"Lessors hereby give and grant to the Lessees the
first right of refusal to renew this lease. Lessees
shall notify the tessors in writing by registered mail
at least ninety (90) days prior to expiration of this
lease of lessees intention to release said premises
herein contained, otherwise Lessors shall assume that
the Lessees does not desire to release and this lease
shall terminate on August 31, 1976. Should Lessees
desire to release, Lessors shall submit to Lessees a
proposed new lease for a ten (10) year term or a bonified offer to lease by a third party within thirty (30)
days of date that request for release has been received
by Lessor.
Should the Lessee feel the lease terms
unreasonable then Lessee will hire a competent appraiser
to place a fair market lease value on said property.
Should Lessor then feel this market value not reasonable,
they will obtain a competent appraiser to place a fair
market value on said property and equipment.
Should the
two appraisers and Lessee and Lessor fail to arrive at
a meeting of the minds, then the two appraisers will
appoint a third appraiser by mutual agreement, to act as
a referee and all parties concerned will be bound by the
finding of appraisers as to fair market value."
This lease, which was assigned to Bowen's, Inc. on August
28, 1975,

(Ex. 2-P) is unclear as to whether or not an option or

first right of refusal is granted to the lessee.

However, there

can be no question that the langauge in that provision grants to
the lessee a right to renew, and as such should be construed in
favor of the lessee.
"As a general rule, when construing provisions
of a lease relative to renewal, the tenant is
favored".
32 Am Jur 809, and
Russell V. Valentine, 14 U. 2d :
376
P.2dof Museum
548and (1960)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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There is uncertainty in the lease agreement, but that
uncertainty should be construed in favor of the tenant.

such a

holding was dictated in Continental Bank & Trust v. Stewart, 4 u.2d
228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955), when this Court stated that interpretation
of the contract where ambiguity exists:
"The Court will endeavor to give the contract a rational
and just construction. This rule is echoed in apt
langauge by Mr. Page in his treatise on contracts:
as between two constructions, each probable, one of
which makes the contract fair and reasonable and the
other of which makes it unfair and unreasonable, the
former should always be preferred".
(P.2d 893)
From the langauge of the lease agreement itself and from
the intent and actions of the parties, Manivest Corporation, there

is no doubt that a renewal of the lease agreement after the expiration of the primary term was intended by all parties.

Manivest

Corporation showed its intent on renewal of the lease when it
entered into an agreement with Bowen's, Inc. in 1975, for a down
payment on pin-setters for the bowling alley.

The down payment

which was made on the pin-setters amounted to a very substantial
investment on equipment which could not have been installed until
the Summer of 1976, which is within a few months of the termination
of the primary term of the lease.

It was the intention of Manivest

Corporation that it would renew the lease at the expiration of the
primary ten-year term.
This intent was also noted by Mr. Symes during the trial
when he noted that Manivest was going to give an option on the
property to whoever the lessee was at the time of the expiration of
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the primary term of the lease.

(TR-179)

It wasn't until Valley

Lanes, Respondents herein, became lessors of the property that it
was apparent that the lease would not be renewed under any
circumstances.

Valley Lanes and its immediate predecessors, who

were the other Respondents herein, sent notice to Bowen's, Inc. that
they would not re-3..ease the premises under any conditions.

(TR-154

and Ex. 8-P)
All of the Respondents herein knew that the intent of
Manivest Corporation was to renew and/or negotiate a new ten year
lease on the subject property.

(TR-179, 182, 217 and 218)

It became apparent to the Respondents that they might have
a chance to eliminate any interest that Bowen's, Inc. might have had
in the property by purchasing Mani vest Corporation's interest in tte
property and then not renewing the lease.

By not renewing the lease,

the Symes could obtain the bowling business which they had wanted,
and Canton and Gallegos could obtain the lounge and caf e business
that they wanted, without either party paying for any of the goodwill, customers, fixtures and improvements that Bowen's, Inc. had
placed into the businesses over the past few years.

The Responden'.5

were not acting in good faith in their meager attempt to renew the
lease after they had obtained the property from Manivest Corporati: 1•
The Respondents demanded $6, 500. 00 monthly rental from Bowen's, In:.
which is 3.8 times the monthly rent of $1,700.00 under the old lea:e.
(Ex. 4-P).
The Trial Court found a monthly rent of the property to
-12-
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$3,500.00, and the appraiser for Bowen's, Inc. determined the amount
to be even less than the amount determined by the Trial Court.

(TR-297

The Respondents had no real intention of renewing the lease with
Bowen's, Inc.
The proposed lease as set out in Exhibit 4-P stated that:
"There will be no negotiations from the specific
terms amended and added into the proposed lease,"
which terms as set forth by the Respondents were totally unconscionable and unreasonable.
Bowen's, Inc. invoked the provision relating to the appointment of appraisers (Ex. 32-D, Par. 7) for determining a reasonable
rental value on the premises.

(Ex 5-P)

However, Bowen's, Inc. was

forced off the property before it could obtain an appraiser.

(TR-123

thru 125)
Even if Bowen's, Inc. had obtained an appraiser for the
property, such an appraisal would have been meaningless because there
was never any real intent on the part of the Respondents to re-lease
the premises for any amount less than a monthly rental of $6,500.00.
Sixty days prior to the expiration of the primary term of
the lease, the Respondents gave notice that there would be no
re-leasing of the subject property.

(Ex. 9-P)

The Respondents had

obtained what they had desired, namely the bowling, cafe, and lounge
businesses, and had effectively paid nothing for these businesses.
Such an inequity should not be allowed, especially under the
circumstances presented herein.

Bowen's, Inc. should be granted the

right to re-lease the subject property at a reasonable rental value
-13-
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and not lose that right because of the unconscionable rent demandec
by the Respondents, which rent could not have been met from the
operations of the bowling business.
POINT III
THE APPOINTMENT OF APPRAISERS AS PROVIDED BY PARAGRAPH VJ!
OF THE LEASE MERELY CONSTITUTES A METHOD OF ARRIVING AT A REASONABU
RENTAL VALUE.
The provision in paragraph VII of Exhibit 3 2-D which relates
to the appointment of appraisers to determine fair rental value is
merely a method to determine a fair rental value and not arbitratio"
of dispute.
In Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees Company, 16 U.2d
223, 398 P.2d 873, the Supreme Court struck down private arbitratio;,
as a method of settling future disputes as being against public
policy since in the court's opinion, basic liberties are impaired
and further stated that such arbitration may prevent access to the
courts, which is counter to the purpose as set forth in Const. Art.
l §10 and §11; Art. 8 and 9; UCA (1953), 78-21-1.

In Barnhart an

uninsured motorist clause in an insurance policy called for arbitra·
tion of any controversies or future disputes.

The case at hand is

clearly distinguishable for the reason that notice of Appellant's
intent to re-lease was given, and Respondents responded.

Thus, if

the court finds that the provisions call for arbitration, a positiC
in which we do not agree, the agreement to arbitrate, occurred by
virtue of the notice of intent to re-lease, and Respondent's
response thereto.

Additionally, if in fact a dispute arose, it di

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

not arise until after the aforesaid agreement came into existence and
thus the agreement, if there be one to arbitrate was to arbitrate the
dispute or grievance presently in existence, which is not outlawed
by Barnhart.
Barnhart can further be distinguished based on the court's
ruling in the 1968 case of Young v. Bridwell, 20 U.2d 686, wherein
the court held that where a lease contains a clause granting an option
subject to arbitration so far as rent is concerned, the lessee has
given notice of its intent to exercise the right, that this is binding
on the lessor insofar as term of lease is concerned.

The Supreme

Court itself, seems to distinguish Barnhart wherein arbitration is
used as a method to determine fair rental value.

This merely

recognizes the practical necessity of providing a method of determining rental value since if the method is not stated in the lease, the
provision may fail for lack of certainty.

Courts in other

jurisdictions also recognize arbitration as a method to determine
fair rental value.

Beel et al v. Dill, 173 Kan 897, 252 P.2d 931

(1953), and Chaney et al, v. Schneider, 206 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1949).
Here defendants proposed amendments to the old lease which related
only to rent and a bond.

There was no dispute as to the other

provisions of the lease, and the method outlined to determine fair
rental value would thus be the logical next step.
The appraisal method of determining fair rental value is
also accepted as a method to determine fair rental value and it is
Appellant's position that such is the method provided in the lease
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in question.

The Court need not even concern itself with problems

of arbitration.
POINT IV
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF
THE MONTHLY RENTAL IN THIS MATTER.
The Trial Court awarded the Respondents $3, 500. 00 monthly
rental for each month that Bowen's, Inc. held the property during
the pendency of this action.

However, neither appraiser from either

of the parties ever testified that $3,500.00 was a reasonable monthl1
rental for the premises herein.

The appraiser for the Respondents

determined the value of the monthly rental to be $3,800.00 per mont\
if the property was in its present condition, and $5, 700. 00 per mont.
when the property was improved with new pin-setters and other impro'1e
ments.

(TR-272)

These figures were based on what other businesses

in the bowling business were doing, and had nothing to do with the
business of Bowen's, Inc.

The appraiser for the Respondents had

guessed at the amount of business and revenue that Bowen's, Inc. was
making to arrive at its figure.

(TR-274)

Since the appraiser for the Respondents had no basis for
his determination as to the monthly rental, his testimony was of
little to no value in helping to determine a fair monthly rental for
the premises herein.
The appraiser for Bowen's, Inc. used a cost approach to
determine a fair monthly rental of the property.

(TR-298 thru 30i

Using a cost approach method, the appraiser for Bowen's, Inc.
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determined the value of t'.1e property to be $21,500.00 per year in its
present condition (which is approximately $1,800.00 per month) and
$41,800.00 per year if new pin-setters were installed (or
approximately $3,500.00 per month).

(TR-297)

The $3,500.00 per month figure arrived at by the Court is
approximately the same amount as determined by Bowen's, Inc.'s
appraisers' valuations of the premises for when it had the pinsetters installed.

The Trial Court had thus misapplied the figures

in this amount as to the reasoanble rental value of the property, and
the property should therefore be decreased to $1,800.00 per month in
relation to the figures as determined by the appraisers for Bowen's,In
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's finding that Charles and Shirley Bowen
were individually liable along with Bowen's, Inc. to the Respondents
is incorrect and without any basis of support.

The judgment obtained

against Charles and Shirley Bowen should be reversed and they should
be dismissed from this action.
Bowen's, Inc. should be given the right to renew the lease
in this matter.

The Respondents acted in bad faith throughout their

course of dealings with Bowen's, Inc.

Equity would demand that

Bowen's, Inc. be given the right to obtain some sort of remuneration
for the businesses which it had developed which the Respondents
obtained when they refused to renew the lease with Bowen's, Inc.
The Trial Court had misapplied the figures as to the
monthly rental value of the property.

The judgment awarded to the

Respondents should be decreased to the appropriate figure of
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$1,800.00 per month for the monthly rental of the property during
the period of time that the property was held by Bowen's, Inc.
during the pendency of this action, or in the alternative that this
matter be remanded to determine the appropriate monthly rental of
the premises.
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